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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EDITH RAGGENBUCK, et al., \ 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, ) 
vs. 
EMIL SUHRMANN, d/b/a SUHR- \. 
MANN'S SOUTH TEMPLE MEAT 
COMPANY, and ALBERT NOORDA / 
and SAM L. GUSS, d/b/a JORDAN ~) 
MEAT & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, 
and VALLEY SAUSAGE COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
No. 
8753 
This is an intermediate appeal taken from that certain 
order entered in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
on the lOth day of September, 1957, whereby eleven suits filed 
by the plaintiffs against the above-named defendants were 
ordered consolidated for trial as to liability only. 
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Each of the eleven suits claim damages suffered by the 
plaintiffs in allegedly contracting trichinosis due to eating a 
sausage product known as metwurst which was manufactured, 
insofar as mixing the raw ingredients were concerned, by 
defendant Valley Sausage Company. The unfinished product, 
then in a raw, unsmoked and inedible state, was sold to de-
fendants and distributors, Jordan Meat and Livestock Com-
pany, who in turn sold the product to the defendant Emil 
Suhrmann. This metwurst was then processed in defendant 
Suhrmann' s smoke oven and thereafter sold by Suhrmann to 
the plaintiffs as retail purchasers. The complaint filed in each 
of the suits is based on negligence of each of the defendants 
and on breach of an implied warranty. The answers filed in 
the cases by each of the defendants raise issues as to liability, 
if any, and there will be sharp conflict in the evidence on these 
issues in any trial of these cases as set forth in the pre-trial 
order dated September 12, 1957 (R. 19-25). 
A motion to amend the pre-trial order was filed by de-
fendants Valley Sausage Company and Jordan Meat & Live-
stock Company in the lower court on September 27, 1957, 
and after hearing arguments thereon, the court again denied 
the defendants a right to a trial of the issues of liability and 
damages before a single jury (R. 28-32). This intermediate 
appeal then was taken (R. 3 7-43), and thereafter granted by 
this Honorable Court (R. 36}. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
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CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY, 
THEREBY LEAVING THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES TO BE 
THEREAFTER TRIED SEP ARA TEL Y BY A DIFFERENT 
JURY IN EACH CASE IS ERRONEOUS, CONTRARY TO 
THE LAW, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT II 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY 
IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS AND WOULD 
RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE DEFEND-
ANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY, 
THEREBY LEAVING THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES TO BE 
THEREAFTER TRIED SEPARATELY BY A DIFFERENT 
JURY IN EACH CASE IS ERRONEOUS, CONTRARY TO 
THE LAW, AND IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
It is the contention of the defendants, and each of them, 
that they are entitled to a trial of all of the issues involved 
in each of these cases, both as to liability and damages, by a 
[ jury consisting of eight ( 8) jurors. 
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The Constitution of the State of Utah, under Article I, 
Section 7, provides as follows: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
and Section 10 of Article I further provides: 
"In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, except in 
capital cases, a jury shall consist of 8 jurors. In courts 
of inferior jurisdiction the jury shall consist of 4 jurors. 
In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In 
civil cases, three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. 
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded." 
The language used in our Utah State Constitution is clear 
in not granting the power to determine the mode of jury trial 
to the legislature or the courts but specifically enumerates the 
number of jurors to constitute a jury and the number required 
to render a verdict. This is clearly indicative that such matters 
were not subject to change, alteration or judicial modification 
without an amendment to our Constitution. It is to be antici-
pated that counsel for plaintiffs will argue that in some in-
stances, the Federal Courts have permitted separate trials of 
the issues of damages and liability and therefore contend that 
there is no violation of any constitutional right. However, it 
is respectfully submitted that Amendment VII to the Consti-
tution of the United States provides that the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved but does not designate the number of 
jurors to constitute a valid jury nor does it restrict the right 
of Congress or the United States Supreme Court to promulgate 
rules pertaining to this right of trial by jury, except as to its 
substantive provision. Thus a comparison of the language used 
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by the framers of the two constitutions leaves a clearly defined 
conclusion that Congress and the Federal Courts have much 
broader powers in promulgating procedural rules with respect 
to the mode of jury trial than do the State legislature and the 
judiciary of Utah. 
We now proceed to a consideration of Title 78-21-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows: 
"In actions for the recovery of specific real or per-
sonal property, with or without damages, or for money 
claimed as due upon contract or as damages for breach 
of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be 
tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is waived or a refer-
ence is ordered." 
and Title 78-21-2 then follows: 
u All questions of fact, (Italics ours) where the trial 
is by jury, other than those mentioned in the next sec-
tion, are to be decided by the jury (italics ours) and 
all evidence thereon is to be addressed to them, except 
when otherwise provided." 
It is to be observed that the legislature has clearly and 
concisely stated in the foregoing statute that all questions of fact 
I • 
are to be decided by the jury which simply means that all issues 
of fact should be tried before one jury and after due delibera-
tion, a verdict rendered thereon. Certainly the language of this 
statute is not open to a variable interpretation. The statute 
does not say that the trial shall be of all issues of fact by 
juries, but specifically states, the jury. 
~ Interpretation of the article "the" has been considered 
~ by the courts in many instances. In the case of Rocci vs. Massa-
~~ chusetts Accident Company, 222 Mass. 336, at page 344, 110 
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NE 972, the court in considering the question of what the word 
"the" meant in an insurance policy on a house said: 
"Within the (italics ours) house naturally means one 
house." 
And in the case of Howell vs. State, 164 Ga. 204, page 210, 
138 SE 206, the court stated: 
"It is true that the word 'the' is the definite article 
and is the word generally used before nouns with partic-
ularizing effect, and as opposed to the indefinite articles 
·a' or ·an', and to the generalizing effect of the latter 
articles. The former particularizes the subject spoken 
of. It is a demonstrative word used especially before 
a noun to particularize its meaning." 
Thus the language used in the Utah statute (Title 78-21-2) 
does not sanction the trial of some of the issues triable by jury 
before one jury, while the remaining issues are withheld from 
its consideration and thereafter submitted for trial by another 
jury. The parties may waive this right but in absence of a con-
sent and waiver, the right to a trial of all of the issues of fact, 
both as to liability and damages, by one jury is substantive and 
must remain inviolate. 
This right is preserved by the provisions of Rule 38 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides as follows: 
"Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as de-
clared by the Constitution or as given by statute shall 
be preserved to the parties." (Italics ours.) 
This procedural rule thus dictates that the right of trial 
by jury and the method prescribed by the Constitution of Utah 
and by our State statutes should be preserved inviolate and not 
in any manner altered by the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Rule 42 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides for separate t~ials in certain situations as follows: 
"Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of con-
venience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate 
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-
party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number 
of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party 
claims, or issues." 
Applying the language of this rule to our instant cases, 
we respectfully submit that the order of consolidation for trial 
of the cases as to liability only would certainly not result in 
any convenience to the trial court or to the parties involved, 
but to the contrary, would result in great inconvenience to 
all concerned. In the event liability was determined adversely 
to the defendants, it would then become necessary to summon 
an additional jury or juries for consideration of damages 
and this would obviously be prejudicial to the defendants, and 
each of them, particularly where there will exist a sharp 
conflict in the evidence as to liability, if any, of each of the 
1 defendants. 
It goes without saying that piecemeal trials are objection-
able and in instances where the issues of liability are so in-
~ separably interwoven with the issues of damages that they 
cannot be judiciously and properly tried separately without 
prejudice to one or some of the parties, then the trial court 
certainly abuses its discretion in ordering separate trials of 
the issues of liability and damages. Such procedure will ir-
reparably prejudice the rights of the parties and in effect denies 
, to them the right to a fair trial by a jury as known at the [, 
common law and under the American system of jurisprudence. 
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In support thereof, defendants cite the case of Y azzo M. V.R. 
vs. Scott, 110 Miss. 443, 67 So. 491, wherein the court said: 
"An examination of the English decisions will dis-
close that those courts, have generally, thoug~ not 
always, declined to limit the issues when ~~ardmg a 
new trial. The ground upon which the deos10n seems 
to proceed is that the verdict of a jury is indivisible, 
and the judgment rendered thereon is an entirety, must 
in all cases be dealt with as such." 
Also, in the case of Donnaton vs. Union Hardware and Metal 
Company, 175 P 26, 38 Cal. App. 8, wherein the court, discuss-
ing the question of limiting a new trial to the issue of damages 
only, said: 
"It would work a grave injustice upon the defendant 
to force it to a new trial of the issue as to damages 
only, with the issue as to liability, upon which no 
verdict other than in name had been rendered, forever 
closed against any inquiry. An examination of all the 
evidence relating to the injury and its cause and the 
conduct of the plaintiff, as well as the defendant's 
agents, might show that it is so interwoven with that 
relating to damages that to fairly ascertain what is just 
compensation the plaintiff should receive, if he is en-
titled to recover at all, can best be determined by trying 
the whole case before one judge and one jury instead of 
splitting it up between different judges and different 
juries." 
This proposition of submitting only a part of the facts 
triable by a jury, to a jury without consent of the parties, was 
considered in the case of Slocum vs. New York Life Insut'ance 
Company, 228 U.S. 364, wherein the Supreme Court of the 
United States speaking through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and 
quoting from the case of Ba1'ney vs. Scl:mzeider, 9 U.S. 248, said: 
10 
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"As the defendant in this case did not waive his 
right to have the facts tried by a jury, it was the duty 
of the court to submit such facts to the jury that was 
sworn to try them. It is needles§ to say that this was 
not done. The statement is clear that the case was 
decided upon the testimony taken at a former trial, 
and not read before this jury, because the court had 
heard it in the first case, and did not deem it necessary 
to be heard by the jury in this case. 
"It is possible to have a jury trial in which the plain-
tiff, having failed to offer any evidence at all, or any 
competent evidence, the jury finds for the defendant 
for that very reason. And in such case it is strictly 
correct, if the plaintiff does not take a non-suit, for the 
court to instruct the jury to find for the defendant. 
But we have never before heard of a case in which 
the jury were permitted, much less instructed, to find 
a verdict for the plaintiff on evidence of which they 
knew nothing except what is detailed to them in the 
charge of the court. It is obvious that if such a verdict 
can be supported here, when the very act of the court 
in doing this is excepted to and relied on as error, the 
trial by jury may be preserved in name, but will be 
destroyed in its essential value, and become nothing 
but the machinery through which the court exercises 
the functions of a jury without its responsibility." 
(Italics ours.) 
Mr. Justice Van Devanter then citing the case of Hodges 
vs. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, and others, at pages 387 and 388 of 
the opinion, concludes: 
"They show that it is the province of the jury to 
hear the evidence and by their verdict to settle the 
issues of fact, no matter what the state of the evidence; 
. . . in other words the constitutional guaranty oper-
ates to require that the issues be settled by the verdict 
of a jury, unless the right thereto be waived." 
11 
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The argument may be suggested that because of the 
numerous parties involved in the consolidation of the cases, 
that such procedure would necessarily impose a substantial 
burden upon the jury in determining the issues of damages, in 
the event the jury found adversely to the defendants, or either 
of them, on liability. This argument is of little merit because 
many cases submitted for a jury trial may only have one party 
plaintiff and one party defendant but the case may involve 
many witnesses, have numerous exhibits introduced into evi-
dence, and be extremely complicated in nature and troublesome 
to the jury in arriving at a determination of the issues. Cer-
tainly this situation would not justify the impaneling of several 
juries to try the issues of liability and then have another jury 
impaneled to determine the issue of damages. It is conceded 
that in certain given situations the Federal Courts have sub-
mitted the determination of the issue of liability to one jury, 
but it should be noted that in those situations where this pro-
cedure has been followed, the facts clearly indicated that the 
issue of damages was ordinarily one of property damage in 
which the amount could easily be ascertained and without 
prejudice to the fundamental rights of the parties. There are 
also some cases where separate issues have been tried by separate 
juries but in those situations, the issues were on questions col-
lateral to the main issue of liability. No prejudice of basic rights 
result where that is done. 
It is basic that the verdict of a jury is indivisible and that 
the award of damages is more often than not tempered by the 
sound discretion of the jury after hearing all of the facts regard· 
ing liability. This is the fundamental strength of reason in 
12 
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the right to a jury trial and the vitality of our American system 
of jurisprudence. 
POINT II 
THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSOLIDATING THE CASES AS TO LIABILITY ONLY 
IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANTS AND WOULD 
RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE TO THE DEFEND-
ANTS. 
The defendants are. not opposed to a trial of these eleven 
cases either upon an individual basis, or by groups of a given 
number of plaintiffs, or all of them consolidated, so long as 
in any method of procedure, the same jury considers the issues 
of liability and thereafter assess the damages, if need be, as to 
one or more of the defendants. As has been previously said. to 
do otherwise and as ordered by the trial court at pretrial, 
would result in manifest injustice to the defendants and be 
prejudicial to their right to an impartial trial by jury. The 
consolidation for trial of all of the cases before one court 
and jury, trying all the issues involved, both as to liability and 
damages, would not create an extraordinary burden upon the 
court or the jury, but to the contrary, would logically expedite 
: a judicial determination of all the issues. As was said by the 
court in the case of United States ex rel Rodriquez vs. Weekly 
· Publications, Incorporated, 9 Fed. Rules Decisions, page 179, 13 
1 Fed. Rules Service at page 769: 
"In support of his motion, the plaintiff asserts that 
whereas the issues of liability are simple and can be 
quickly disposed of by a jury, the issues of damages 
13 
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are exceedingly complicated and will undoubtedly re-
quire the services of a master. In substance, h?wever, 
the plaintiff wants two jury trials, one to const~er the 
question of liability and the othe~ to ~scer_tat~ the 
damages . . . The gravamen of thts act~on ts aaud. 
An indispensible element of a cause of actiOn for fraud 
is damages. In other words, fraud in the abstract does 
not give rise to a claim. It is only fraud causilly con-
nected to damage which is the basis of an action. In the 
instant case, the segregation of the issues of liability 
and damages and their trial to two separate juries 
would mean that the first jury would be confronted 
with the question of fraud in the abstract without the 
necessary connection to specific damages and the second 
jury would be confronted with the issues of damages 
without having before it the links which unite them 
to the fraud. That this is the danger to which such a 
severance would expose this litigation is made clear by 
the very suggestion of the plaintiff's counsel . . . This 
is not a separate defense, such as the statute of frauds 
or release, or the statute of limitations, which may be 
separately adjudicated without in any way interfering 
with the trial of the remaining issues . . . In a cause 
of action for fraud, tried to a jury, this severability 
does not appear to be feasible." 
The above court then denied plaintiffs motion for separate 
trials of the issues of fraud and damages because of the obvious 
prejudicial effect to the defendant. This same problem was 
considered in the case of Eichinger z·s. Firemans Fund Insurance 
Company, 20 Fed. Rules Decisions, page 204, 23 Fed. Rules 
Service, at page 526, wherein the court said: 
"As a preliminary reflection, it may well be recog· 
nized that within the thought of the rules as a whole, 
and as . a proce~ural charter, there is an impalpable 
suggestiOn that, m default of controlling considerations 
14 
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to the contrary, a single submission of all of the issues 
in a civil action should be favored rather than their 
resolution in piecemeal trials . . . It is also asserted, 
not wholly without force, that the issues as against the 
separate groups of defendants are of such character 
that they may not be presented to a single jury with 
a degree of clarity adequate to their intelligent com-
prehension and answer. That the case does confront 
the trial judge with a task of sobering magnitude and 
delicacy, the court unhesitatingly grants. It also imposes 
a heavy burden of discrimination in advocacy upon 
the attorneys by whom it will be tried. But the court 
is convinced that neither the duty of the trial judg~ 
nor that of counsel is necessarily, or reasonably, be-
yond intelligible performance in the exercise of the 
care requisite for it. Impossibility of such performance 
certainly would require that there be separate trials. 
Difficulty of execution, however austere, if short of 
practical impossibility, should not. Both judge and 
counsel may prefer becomingly to avoid the perform-
ance of notably difficult assignments. Neither should 
evade them by cowardly flight." 
It is thus to be observed that courts are reluctant in per-
mitting cases to be tried in piecemeal fashion, and rightly so, 
for the obvious reason that prejudice will result in most in-
: stances and the parties involved in the litigation be unlawfully 
· deprived of their basic rights to a determination of the issues 
i by a jury of their own peers. This doesn't mean a consideration 
' by one or more juries; the right simply means that a person 
·should have the fundamental assurance that a jury who is to 
hold him liable and thereafter assess damages, if need be, shall 
only do so after a careful consideration of all of the facts both 
1
ias to those of liability and damages. To do otherwise, would 
~~be to invade our American jury system and effectively destroy 
15 
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its fundamental concepts which have endured over the cen-
turies. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion and by way of summary, it is the contention 
of the appellants that the trial court abused its discretion in 
making and entering its order consolidating all of these cases 
for trial as to liability only. We respectfully reiterate that 
such procedure is erroneous and unconstitutional, prejudicial 
to the fundamental rights of each of the appellants herein, and 
would result in manifest injustice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
GRANT MACFARLANE 
and WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
1105 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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